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Satoshi Gazette
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Researchers Say Code Served Through Optimizely on 178 Organizations' Websites, Ledger's Among Them, Could Swap Wallet Addresses

Optimizely says an unauthorized party used a flaw in its account signup flow to add malicious code to some customer projects; Ledger says the code is no longer served through ledger.com and that private keys remain protected by its devices. The bitcoin address researchers say the code swapped in received 0.08528782 BTC on 16 November. No record or researcher ties any of those payments to a visitor of a named site.

A brown parcel whose white address label has a second label stuck over it, one corner lifting. Illustration generated by Satoshi Gazette.

Code that could swap a cryptocurrency wallet address someone copied for an attacker's was served to visitors of 178 organizations' websites on 16 November 2026, the security firm Report URI says. Its list of the 178 includes Ledger, a maker of hardware wallets for bitcoin.04 The code came through Optimizely Web Experimentation, a service companies use to test different versions of their web pages on visitors. A second security firm, StepSecurity, read the same code and also says it replaced wallet addresses.05

Optimizely said in a notice on its status page at 01:02 UTC on 17 November that "an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects". It said it had fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code, and added: "We've also taken steps to secure affected user accounts and put additional protections in place to prevent unauthorized code from being delivered."01 On X at 01:21 UTC the company said the incident affected "some Optimizely Web Experimentation customers" and that "customers have been contacted directly".02 At 14:49 UTC on 18 November it added a fuller account to the notice: the unauthorized party "exploited a flaw in the Optimizely Web Experimentation account signup flow" and used it "to impersonate users on targeted customer accounts and insert malicious JavaScript into those customers’ projects". Optimizely says it detected the activity on the day it began and "blocked delivery of the malicious code and closed the vulnerability within three hours of detection"; it does not give the time it detected it. "This was not a credentials breach," the notice says, and "Less than 5% of our customers were impacted." The notice is not marked resolved.01 None of the company's statements names a customer, a coin or an address.

Ledger's security research team, Donjon, said on X at 07:42 UTC on 17 November that Optimizely is "a third-party service used on ledger.com, alongside numerous other websites", and that "the malicious code is no longer being served through our website". It added: "This incident does not affect the security architecture of Ledger devices. Your private keys remain protected by your Ledger device."03 The statement does not say when the code was served on ledger.com or on which pages.

Scott Helme of Report URI published his account at 22:47 UTC on 16 November. Each Optimizely Web Experimentation customer's pages load a JavaScript file from Optimizely's servers, he writes. The attacker wrote code into a field of customer projects where each customer can add code of its own to run on every page, and the file was still served from Optimizely's servers with Optimizely's certificate, "from a host that every affected site already trusted". He found the code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely files he checked, belonging to 178 organizations, and lists ledger.com and www.ledger.com under Ledger. "The real number is likely higher," he writes.04

By his account, the code loaded a script that replaced wallet addresses, skimmed payment cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads loaded code built to break into older versions of iOS. The script "finds any valid wallet address", he writes, for bitcoin, ether and chains built like Ethereum's, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin, "and replaces it with one of the attacker's", in page text, form fields, links and the clipboard: "Copy an address from any affected page, or from anywhere else while that tab is open, and you may paste the attacker's."04 StepSecurity, which read the same script, says it replaces an address only "when nearby text contains a payment word such as wallet, deposit or send". The two accounts differ on that point. Both firms list the same eight replacement addresses; the one for bitcoin is 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW.05

Report URI's timeline puts the first injection seen through Optimizely at 04:21 UTC on 16 November and a clean-up of most files between about 20:40 and 21:10 UTC; it times the clean-up of Ledger's file at 20:41 UTC. At 21:52 UTC one of the 188 files still carried the code; from 23:11 UTC Report URI observed all of them clean.04

On the chain, five transactions paid the bitcoin replacement address a total of 0.08528782 BTC between 11:13 and 19:57 UTC on 16 November. The largest payment, 0.07607213 BTC, came at 13:18 UTC.07 At 05:39 UTC on 17 November a single transaction sent the whole balance, less a fee, to another address: 0.08524462 BTC to bc1q5fljq9c4g7gsjgg4etpn6k3lyusahcvjfv0u99.08

Report URI writes: "Crypto has already been stolen, with verified transactions to the attackers."04 StepSecurity says the largest payment and the first each came inside a batched transaction, one that made many payments at once, 20 in one and 15 in the other: "typical of an exchange withdrawal, which fits either reading: a victim withdrawing to a swapped address, or the attacker cashing out".05 Hudson Rock, a third security firm, says of the receipts Report URI had counted by 19:25 UTC on 16 November, on every coin and four of the five bitcoin payments, that it "has not independently linked those transfers to affected visitors; this is not a confirmed incident-loss figure".06 No record or researcher ties any of the five bitcoin payments to a visitor of a named site.

Neither company's public statement tells visitors how to check whether they were affected. Report URI's advice to anyone who visited an affected site on 16 November: "Check any crypto transfer you made. If the address you pasted doesn't match the one you meant to pay, it may have been swapped." It also advises updating iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, and watching card statements.04 StepSecurity advises anyone who copied a wallet address on an affected site between about 04:00 and 21:00 UTC that day to "verify wallet addresses on a hardware-wallet screen", and writes: "Check the address on your wallet or hardware-wallet screen against the one you meant to use, not against what you copied."05

Asked Ledger and Optimizely on 18 November, 08:52 UTC. Optimizely replied at 15:59 UTC with a statement saying it is "working with third-party experts on a comprehensive investigation" and that it had no further comment. Ledger had not answered by publication.